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ABSTRACT

A Singular-Value-Based Semi-Fragile Watermarking Scheme for
Image Content Authentication with Tampering Localization
by

Xing Xin, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2010

Major Professor: Dr. Xiaojun Qi
Department: Computer Science

This thesis presents a novel singular-value-based semi-fragile watermarking scheme
for image content authentication with tampering localization. The proposed scheme first
generates a secured watermark bit sequence by performing a logical “xor” operation on a
content-based watermark and content-independent watermark, wherein the content-based
watermark is generated by a singular-value-based watermark bit sequence that represents
intrinsic algebraic image properties, and the content-independent watermark is generated
by a private-key-based random watermark bit sequence. It next embeds the secure
watermark in the approximation subband of each non-overlapping 4×4 block using the
adaptive quantization method to generate the watermarked image. The image content
authentication process starts with regenerating the secured watermark bit sequence
following the same process mentioned in the secured watermark bit sequence generation.
It then extracts a possibly embedded watermark using the parity of the quantization
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results from the probe image. Next, the authentication process constructs a binary error
map, whose height and width are a quarter of those of the original image, using the
absolute difference between the regenerated secured watermark and the extracted
watermark. It finally computes two authentication measures (i.e., M1 and M2), with M1
measuring the overall similarity between the regenerated watermark and the extracted
watermark, and M2 measuring the overall clustering level of the tampered error pixels.
These two authentication measures are further seamlessly integrated in the authentication
process to confirm the image content and localize any possible tampered areas. The
extensive experimental results show that the proposed scheme outperforms four peer
schemes and is capable of identifying intentional tampering, incidental modification, and
localizing tampered regions.
(63 pages)
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Significance
Trustworthy digital multimedia plays an important role in applications, such as news
reporting, intelligence information gathering, criminal investigation, security
surveillance, and health care. However, all too often this trustworthiness can no longer
be taken for granted since users can easily manipulate, modify, or forge digital content
without causing noticeable traces, using low-cost and easy-to-use digital multimedia
editing software. Therefore, digital multimedia authentication has become an important
issue.
Recently, digital watermarking techniques have been considered as one of the most
promising techniques for multimedia authentication. The goal of watermarking is to
embed into the image data a mark that can identify the copyright owner of the work.
Among these, semi-fragile watermarking techniques have been proposed to protect
copyright and prove tampering of the digital content. These techniques allow acceptable
content-preserving manipulations, such as common image processing and
JPEG/JPEG2000 compression, while detecting content-altering malicious manipulations
such as removal, addition, and modification of objects.
Background
Here, I briefly review the history of digital watermarking techniques and its six
important properties followed by a discussion the general framework of semi-fragile
watermarking techniques and some representative semi-fragile watermarking techniques.

2
Digital Watermarking
Digital watermarking is a label applied to digital media to automatically detect and
possibly prosecute copyright infringement. Digital watermarking is not a new technique.
Its history can be traced back to 13th century Europe. At that time, a visible personal
mark or signature was superimposed on an image that needed protection [1]. It is a
simple but very effective method that is still widely used as a security protection method
nowadays.
In the early years of digital watermarking history, despite its visibility, it worked well.
Visible watermarking is clearly not ideal for art work, since superimposed marks bring
distortions that decrease the visual quality. In general, an efficient digital watermarking
requires the following properties [2]:
1. Invisibility: The watermark should be embedded into the image, video, or audio
signal and not be visible to the user. The minimum requirement of invisibility is to
keep the distortion introduced by the watermark lower than the just-noticeable
distortion (JND) of the image. Several researchers have invented JND based on the
contrast sensitivity function (CSF) and Watson model [3, 4].
2. Tamper detection: Watermark detection results of the existence of certain watermark
information should be very reliable. This is related to two concepts, false positive
alarm and false negative alarm. A false positive error happens when there is no
watermark in the host media, though the detector declares there is. On the other hand,
a false negative error happens when there is watermark in the host media, though the
detector declares there is not.
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3. Discrimination of incidental distortion and malicious tampering: The most important
and difficult issue in digital watermarking, this discrimination includes tolerance to
common image processing (i.e., image enhancement, and median filtering) and image
compressions (i.e., JPEG, and JPEG2000). A semi-fragile watermarking scheme is
supposed to be able to survive all those distortions but still detect malicious
tampering (i.e., adding, removing, and changing objects).
4. Security: The embedded watermark should be impervious to forgery and
manipulation.
5. Identification of tampered areas: The location of altered areas should be highly
disposed to estimation and the other areas highly disposed to verification as
authenticated.
6. Oblivion with no transmission of any secret information: The original image or
explicit information derived from the original image should not be needed in the
authentication process.
Semi-Fragile Watermarking
Figure 1 shows the framework of a typical semi-fragile watermarking scheme. It
consists of two components: the embedding scheme and the extraction scheme. Here, I
briefly review these two components.
The Embedding Scheme. The embedding scheme consists of two steps: watermark
generation and watermark embedding.
The watermark generation step generates the watermark(s) to be embedded. In
general, the watermark can be a randomly generated binary sequence, a binary image, or

4

Figure 1. The framework of a typical semi-fragile watermarking scheme.
a content-based signature. A content-based signature can be obtained by feature
extraction techniques.
The watermark embedding step embeds the generated watermark message into the
original image. A variety of watermark embedding techniques have been proposed in the
literature. These techniques can be categorized into spatial domain-based and frequency
domain-based embedding techniques. In general, frequency-based watermarking
techniques are better than spatial-based watermarking techniques from the following two
perspectives:
1. Frequency-based watermarking techniques can achieve better invisibility than
spatial-based watermarking techniques because a small modification of some of
the coefficients in the frequency domain causes small global changes when
transforming back to the spatial domain (i.e., all the coefficients in the
transformed spatial domain are changed on a small scale).
2. Frequency-based watermarking techniques are more robust than spatial-based
watermarking techniques because the relationship of coefficients in the frequency
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domain cannot be easily affected by attacks which modify the coefficients in the
spatial domain.
Most watermarking techniques use either an additive or a multiplicative function in
the frequency domain, i.e., discrete Fourier transform (DFT), discrete cosine transform
(DCT), or discrete wavelet transform (DWT) to embed watermark information. Both
types of functions keep the least significant bits or the parity of transformation
coefficients, or the relationship of certain transformation coefficients.
The Extraction Scheme. The extraction scheme consists of two steps: watermark
extraction and watermark authentication.
The watermark extraction step should be specifically designed to pair with the
embedding scheme to retrieve the embedded watermark under various intentional or unintentional attacks that may occur in the real world.
The watermark authentication step compares the extracted watermark with the
embedded watermark to authenticate the image content. For watermarked images that
undergo some incidental distortions, there will be little or no difference between the
extracted and the embedded watermarks. That is, this slight difference can be used to
indicate that watermarks can be successfully extracted under incidental distortions. In
other words, the scheme is robust to incidental distortions. For the watermarked images
that undergo malicious attacks, the extracted watermark will be significantly different
from the embedded watermark. That is, this significant difference can be used to validate
the authenticity of the image content and to localize the distortion areas if malicious
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attacks do take place. In other words, the scheme is fragile to malicious tampering
distortions.
Next, I briefly review several representative semi-fragile watermarking schemes in
the domain of DCT or DWT. In general, these schemes use the chosen transform domain
as the media to embed and extract watermarks. They then use the extracted watermarks
to authenticate the digital content and localize the tampered areas if possible.
DCT-based Semi-fragile Watermarking Schemes. Lin et al. [5] propose embedding
Gaussian distribution-based block patterns in the DCT domain. Tampering detection is
accomplished by verifying the correlation on these block patterns. This scheme can
identify altered regions within a watermarked image with 75% accuracy under moderate
compression and near 90% accuracy under light compression. Lin and Chang [6]
propose to generate the invariant features at a predetermined JPEG quality factor and
embed these features into mid-frequency of 8×8 DCT blocks. This scheme is robust
against substitution of blocks and improves on the method proposed in [5], in that false
alarms near edges hardly occur. However, it fails to detect malicious attacks that
preserve the sign of the DCT coefficients. Ho and Li [7] propose a similar yet better
scheme by using the relationship of DCT coefficients in low and middle frequencies.
This scheme protects the authenticity of a compressed watermarked image while the
JPEG quality is higher than the authors’ predefined lowest authenticable quality. Maeno
et al. [8] propose two methods to address the shortcomings of [6]. The first method adds
a random bias factor to the fixed decision boundary to catch the malicious manipulation
and keep the false alarm rate low. The second method uses a non-uniform quantization
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scheme to improve accuracy in encoding the relationships between paired transform
coefficients and increase the alteration detection sensitivity.
DWT-based Semi-fragile Watermarking Schemes. Kundar and Hatzinakos [9] embed
a watermark in a quantized DWT domain. Zhou et al. [10] propose to embed a signature
from the original image into the wavelet coefficients. Kang and Park [11] incorporate the
just noticeable differences feature to improve the performance of [5] for discriminating
malicious from nonmalicious attacks. Hu and Han [12] propose to extract image features
from low-frequency wavelet coefficients to generate two watermarks: one for classifying
the intentional content modification and the other for indicating the modification location.
Liu et al. [13] use Zernike moments in the DWT domain as features for the authentication
task. Zhu et al. [14] apply the block-mean-based quantization strategy to embed the
inter-block and intra-block signatures in the DWT domain for tamper detection and
localization, respectively. Yang and Sun [15] embed the watermark by integrating the
human visual system model to modify the vertical and horizontal subbands of image
subblocks. Che et al. [16] use the dynamic quantized approach to embed watermark in
low-frequency wavelet coefficients. Cruz et al. [17] employ the vector quantization
method to embed a robust signature into the approximation subband of each image subblock. However, all these schemes are only robust to moderate JPEG compression (i.e.,
JPEG compression of higher than a 50% to 60% quality factor). The false alarm rates for
watermarking schemes proposed in [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17] are high under common
image processing attacks. Specifically, the schemes proposed in [9] and [13] achieve a
32×32 detection unit, and Cruz’s scheme [17] achieves a 16×16 detection unit.
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Organization of Thesis
In this paper, we propose a novel semi-fragile watermarking scheme by generating a
secure watermark that results from performing the logical operation “xor” between a
content-based watermark and content-independent watermark. Here, a content-based
watermark is a singular-value-based feature, and a content-independent watermark is a
private-key-based random watermark. The proposed scheme then embeds the secure
watermark in the wavelet domain using the adaptive quantization method. The proposed
watermarking scheme further utilizes two authentication measures derived from a binary
error map to authenticate the image content and localize the tampered areas. This scheme
also possesses all the desired properties mentioned earlier for an effective authentication
watermarking scheme.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II presents the proposed
scheme, Chapter III analyzes the performance of the proposed scheme, Chapter IV
presents the extensive experimental results of the proposed scheme, and Chapter V
summarizes the conclusions and provides directions for future work.
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CHAPTER II
THE PROPOSED APPROACH
The proposed semi-fragile watermarking scheme consists of four components:
secured watermark generation, watermark embedding, watermark extraction, and
watermark authentication. This chapter starts with a brief introduction of several
important notations and concepts used in my thesis, followed by a detailed explanation of
each component.
Important Notations and Concepts
In this section, I briefly introduce the singular value decomposition (SVD), DWT,
and the terminology used in the following sections for ease of discussion of the proposed
approach.
SVD
Any m×n real-valued matrix A with m >= n can be written as the product of three
matrices: A = USVT. The columns of the m×m matrix U are mutually orthogonal unit
vectors, as are the columns of the n× n matrix V. The m× n matrix S is a pseudodiagonal matrix, and the diagonal entries are known as SVs (Singular Values) of A. While
both U and V are not unique, the SVs are fully determined by A. That is, the SVs of a
matrix are unique. The SVs of a square matrix of size n× n are n descending values
along the diagonal of the matrix S. From the viewpoint of image processing applications,
SVs represent intrinsic algebraic image properties. Figure 2 shows a simple example of
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Figure 2. Example of singular value decomposition.
singular value decomposition. The two singular values are 5 and 3, which are located
along the diagonal of the matrix S.
DWT
DWT includes many kinds of transforms, such as Haar wavelet, Daubechies wavelet,
and others. My thesis utilizes the Haar wavelet. For an input represented by a list of 2n
numbers, the Haar wavelet transform may be considered to simply pair up input values,
storing the difference and passing the sum. This process is repeated recursively, pairing
up the sums to provide the next scale: finally resulting in 2n − 1 differences and one final
sum. For ease of understanding, Figure 3 shows the workflow of DWT. After applying a
1-level DWT on an image, we get the approximation subband LL, the horizontal subband
LH, the vertical subband HL, and the diagonal subband HH. Moreover, if we want to
apply a 2-level DWT on the image, we just simply apply another 1-level DWT on the
approximation subband LL. After applying a 2-level DWT, we also get the approximation
subband LL2, the horizontal subband LH2, the vertical subband HL2, and the diagonal
subband HH2 of the approximation subband LL other than subbands LH, HL, HH.
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Figure 3. The workflow of discrete wavelet transform.

Table 1 Watermarking Terminology.
Host image/Original image
Probe image
W and W’
I and I’
k

The image used for embedding the watermark
The image used for watermark extraction
The original and extracted watermark sequences
The original and watermarked images
The secret key

Terminology
For the purposes of this discussion, it is useful to summarize the most commonly used
terminology. Various research groups, such as image processing, communication theory,
and cryptography, have studied watermarking. Although, they have slightly different
terminology from each other, most of these approaches share some common standards or
rules. Table 1 provides a guide to the most frequently used terminology.
Secured Watermark Generation
Using the specific relationships of SVs of the horizontal, vertical, and diagonal
subbands of each 4×4 block of the original image, we generate a content-based
watermark that represents intrinsic algebraic image properties to facilitate the
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authentication process. The detailed steps for generating the content-based watermark
are as follows:
1. Divide the original image I into non-overlapping 8×8 blocks.
2. For each 8×8 block (i.e., Blk), modify its coefficient (i.e., Blk(x,y)) to an integral
multiple (i.e., modified-Blk(x,y)) of the quantization matrix Q (shown in Figure 4)
which is used in JPEG compression [18], where 1 <= x <= 8 and 1 <= y <= 8. See
formula (1). After applying this on each block, the original image is represented
as a quantized image modified-I.
mod ified  Blk ( x, y)  round ( Blk ( x, y) / Q( x, y)) ×Q( x, y)

(1)

Figure 4. Quantization matrix.
3. Divide the quantized image modified-I into non-overlapping 4×4 blocks.
4. For each 4×4 block modified-Bi, where i ranges from 1 to the total number of
blocks, perform the following operations:
4.1.Divide into 2×2 sub-blocks to obtain subblock1i, subblock2i, and subblock3i
(shown in Figure 5). The upper left subblock is not used. Here, I briefly
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Figure 5. Illustration of subblocks.
explain why it is not used. As discussed in the next section, Watermark Embedding, we
choose to use the upper-left value X of the approximation subband LL of modified-Bi as
the media for the embedding process. X is exactly related to the four values in the unused subblock. So, we choose not to use this upper left sub-block to ensure the
robustness of both the content-based watermark and the embedding scheme.
4.2.Apply SVD on subblock1i to obtain three matrices U1i, S1i, and V1i, where
subblock1i = U1i×S1i×V1iT. Apply the SVD on subblock2i and subblock3i to
obtain U2i, S2i, and V2i, and U3i, S3i, and V3i, respectively.
4.3.Generate a watermark bit based on the relationship of SVs of subblock1i,
subblock2i, and subblock3i. These SVs correspond to the three values (i.e., S1i
(1, 1), S2i (1, 1), and S3i (1, 1)). The singular values are in descending order
as introduced above, so we choose the first one, which is the most notable and
stable, to generate the watermark bit. The rules for generating the contentbased watermark bit CWi are as follows:
4.3.1. Generate bit B1 using S1i (1,1) and S2i (1, 1) based on the relationship:
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1
B1  
0

if S1i (1,1)  S 2 i (1,1)

(2)

Otherwise

4.3.2. Generate bit B2 using S2i (1,1) and S3i (1, 1) based on the relationship:
1
B2  
0

if S 2 i (1,1)  S 3i (1,1)

(3)

Otherwise

4.3.3. Generate bit B3 using S3i (1,1) and S1i (1, 1) based on the relationship:
1
B3  
0

if S 3i (1,1)  S1i (1,1)

(4)

Otherwise

4.3.4. Generate the content-based watermark bit CWi using:
CWi  xor ( xor ( B1 , B2 ), B3 )

(5)

For security reasons, we also generate a random content-independent watermark bit
sequence IW, which has the same length as the content-based watermark. This
watermark bit sequence is generated by using the Mersenne Twister algorithm [19] and a
private key k [6]. Using the correct private key, the same IW can be generated for the
original image and its probe images (i.e., possibly distorted watermarked images).
The embedded secured watermark Wi is finally generated by performing the logical
operation “xor” on the random watermark IWi and the content-based watermark CWi.
Watermark Embedding
We divide the original image into non-overlapping 4×4 blocks and sequentially
embed W in the wavelet domain of each 4×4 block. We utilize the parity of the quantized
value of the approximation subband to embed the watermark. To ensure the watermark’s
invisibility and increase robustness against common image processing attacks, we choose
to use the upper-left value X of the approximation subband as the media for the

15
embedding process. The strategy of embedding a watermark bit is as follows. Compute
the quantized value Xq by getting the integer part of X divided by a quantizer q. If the
parity of Xq equals to the embedding bit, change X to Xq×q. Otherwise, change X to Xq×q
plus q. All these changes ensure that the parity of the modified X is consistent with the
embedding bit. It should be noted that the bigger q is, the bigger the changes,
consequently, the worse the quality of the watermarked image, and the stronger the
robustness. In our system, the value of q is adaptive and different for each block.
Specifically, as introduced in the section entitled Secured Watermark Generation, we use
the total of B1, B2, and B3 (e.g., Sum) of each block to decide the corresponding
quantization value of q.
11
13

q
15
17

if B1  B 2  B3  0
if B1  B 2  B3  1

(6)

if B1  B 2  B3  2
if B1  B 2  B3  3

The detailed embedding procedure is shown below. It should be noted that the
boundary check process summarized in step 2.5 is necessary when some blocks are all
0’s (black) or all 255’s (white).
1. Divide the original image I into non-overlapping 4×4 blocks.
2. For each 4×4 block Bi and its corresponding embedded watermark bit Wi, perform
the following operations:
2.1 Apply the 1-level Haar wavelet transform to obtain the approximation
subband LLi, the horizontal subband LHi, the vertical subband HLi, and the
diagonal subband HHi.
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2.2 Quantize the upper-left value of LLi (i.e., LLi(1,1)) by its quantizer q, as
computed by equation (3),using:
X q  LLi (1,1) / q

(7)

2.3 Modify the LLi(1,1) value by:

X q  q
LLi (1,1)  

X q  q  q

if mod( X q ,2)  Wi
otherwise

(8)

where mod(Xq, 2) computes the remainder of Xq divided by 2.
2.4 Apply the inverse 1-level Haar wavelet transform to obtain the watermarked
block.
2.5 Perform the boundary check on the 2×2 upper-left corner of the watermarked
block to ensure that its four values are in the proper range. For an 8-bit
grayscale image, this range is [0- q/4, 255+q/4]. If any of the four values in
the 2×2 upper-left corner falls outside of the proper range, apply the following
remedy strategies:
a) If one value is larger than the upper-bound of the allowable range,
modify LLi(1,1) by:
LLi (1,1)  X q  q  q

(9)

b) If one value is smaller than the lower-bound of the allowable range,
modify LLi(1,1) by:
LLi (1,1)  X q  q  2  q

(10)

c) Apply the inverse 1-level Haar wavelet transform to obtain the corrected
watermarked block. If any value in the 2×2 upper-left corner of the
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corrected watermark block falls outside of the proper range, modify its
value by adding or subtracting 4×q to ensure the modified value is in the
proper range and the parity of Xq is intact.
Figure 6 illustrates the effects of embedding the watermark in the wavelet domain,
using the above quantization method. This figure shows that each LLi(1,1)’s is modified
to the nearest 0 bin (the dashed line) or 1 bin (the solid line) according to its quantized
value Xq and the embedding bit Wi.

Figure 6. Illustration of the quantization process.
Watermark Extraction
The watermark extraction process uses the same blocking strategy to divide the image
into non-overlapping 4×4 blocks. It then uses the parity of the quantized upper-left value
X’ of the approximation subband of each block to extract the watermark bit. Here, the q
value used for quantization is calculated by using the same strategy as in the watermark
embedding process. The detailed steps are as follows:
1. Divide the probe image I’ into non-overlapping 4×4 blocks.
2. For each 4×4 block Bi’, perform the following operations:
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2.1 Apply the 1-level Haar wavelet transform to obtain the approximation
subband LLi’, the horizontal subband LHi’, the vertical subband HLi’, and the
diagonal subband HHi’.
2.2 Quantize the upper-left value of LLi’ (i.e., LLi’(1,1)) by its quantizer q
computed by equation (5) using:
X 'q  round ( LL'i (1,1) / q)

(11)

2.3 Set the extracted watermarked bit EWi as mod(Xq’, 2).
Watermark Authentication
We generate a binary error map to perform the watermark authentication task. First
of all, we simulate the process of generating the secured watermark W’ by applying the
logical operation “xor” on the content-based watermark CW’ and the content-independent
random watermark IW’. Here, CW’ is a regenerated content-based watermark using the
same strategy introduced in the Secured Watermark Generation section, and IW’ is a
content-independent watermark that is exactly the same as IW introduced in the Secured
Watermark Generation section. Since the extracted watermark EW reflects the changes
of local intensity resulting from attacks, we construct the error map, i.e., ErrorMap, by
mapping the absolute difference between EWi and W’i (i.e., |EWi−W’i|) onto its
corresponding 4×4 block. The 0’s and 1’s in ErrorMap indicate the match and mismatch
between extracted and embedded watermarks, respectively. In other words, any pixel
with the value of 1’s in ErrorMap is an error pixel. In the proposed system, we classify
the error pixels into three categories: strongly tampered, mildly tampered, and isolated
error pixels. Figure 7 illustrates these three categories of error pixels in red solid circles
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Figure 7. Examples of three categories of error pixels shown in red solid circles. (a)
strongly tampered error pixel, (b) mildly tampered error pixel, and (c) isolated error pixel.

using a window size of 3×3. Specifically, we consider an error pixel as strongly
tampered if at least four of its eight neighbors are error pixels (marked by black solid
circles); an error pixel as mildly tampered if one, two, or three of its eight neighbors are
error pixels; and an error pixel as isolated (i.e., likely caused by noise) if none of its eight
neighbors is an error pixel. As a result, we do not consider the isolated error pixel as the
tampered error pixel and consider both strongly tampered and mildly tampered error
pixels as tampered error pixels. It should be noted that the window size and thresholds of
the number of neighboring error pixels in the window for defining strongly tampered and
mildly tampered error pixels can be set differently based on the specific application
requirement. They also determine the sensitivity of the authentication process.
We next define two authentication measures, M1 and M2, to protect copyright and
prove tampering, where M1 measures the overall similarity between extracted and
embedded watermarks and M2 measures the overall clustering level of the tampered error
pixels. We compute M1 as the percentage of error pixels (i.e., 1’s) in ErrorMap. We
compute M2 as the ratio between the number of strongly tampered error pixels and the
number of tampered error pixels in ErrorMap. The detailed steps for computing M2 are
as follows:
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1. Initialize TamPixNum and StrongTamPixNum as 0’s, where TamPixNum stores
the number of tampered error pixels and StrongTamPixNum stores the number of
strongly tampered error pixels.
2. For each error pixel, perform the following operations:
2.1. If it is tampered (i.e., mildly or strongly tampered), add TamPixNum by 1.
2.2. If it is strongly tampered, add StrongTamPixNum by 1.
3. Compute M2 by:
0

M 2   StrongTamPixNum
 TamPixNum

if TamPixNum  0
otherwise

(12)

Finally, we design a quantitative method to decide the authenticity of the probe image
based on the two authentication measures. The algorithmic view of the authentication
process is summarized below:
1. Compute M1 using ErrorMap.
2. If M1 ≤ Tmedian (i.e., 0.15), update ErrorMap as its 3×3 median filtering result.
3. Compute M2 using ErrorMap.
4. If 0 ≤ M1 < Thalferrorbit,
a. if M2 < Tmalicious, the probe image is authenticated
b. else the probe image is maliciously attacked.
5. If Thalferrorbit ≤ M1 < Terrorbit.
a. if M2 < Tmalicious, the probe image is incidentally attacked
b. else the probe image is maliciously attacked.
6. If M1 ≥ Terrorbit, the probe image is not embedded with watermarks.
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It is important to apply the median filtering on ErrorMap when M1 is less than or
equal to 0.15 (i.e., at most 15% of 4×4 blocks are detected as distorted). Due to the small
amount of distortions, we can infer that the probe image must have undergone small
malicious attacks or moderate incidental attacks. That is, the tampered regions would be
small and tend to cluster if malicious attacks occurred, and the tampered regions would
be small and tend to scatter if moderate incidental attacks occurred. This median filtering
removes all mildly tampered error pixels. It also treats non-error pixels as error pixels if
the non-error pixels are surrounded by at least five error pixels. That is, this filtering
keeps the clustered error pixels intact and makes scattered mildly tampered error pixels
and isolated error pixels disappear. As a result, the small malicious attack leads to a
larger M2 value due to the removal of mildly distorted error pixels. The extensive
experiments show that the value of 0.15 for Tmedian works well on all 30 test images and
all the simulated attacks.
The remaining thresholds, i.e., Terrorbit, Thalferrorbit, and Tmalicious, involved in the
authentication process are determined based on the predefined false negative probability
of 10-6. The threshold for Terrorbit is derived as follows. The probability for a pixel in
ErrorMap to be detected as 0 or 1 is 0.5. So, each pixel is a binomially distributed
random variable. The expected value (i.e., E(errorbit)) and the variance of error bits (i.e.,
Var(errorbit)) are respectively 0.5×numel and 0.5×(1-0.5)×numel=0.25×numel, where
numel is the total number of pixels in ErrorMap. Therefore, we deduce the threshold for
detecting if the probe image has been embedded with the watermark bits by:
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  E (errorbit ) 
6
P(Terrorbit   1 )  1  P(Terrorbit   1 )  1   
  1  10
Var
(
errorbit
)


  1  7924.9  Terrorbit 

7924.9
 0.4837
numel

(13)

Here, Φ approaches the normal distribution with an expected value of 0 and a
variance of 1 when numel is large. Hence, we consider that the image is not embedded
with the watermark if M1 ≥ Terrorbit = 0.4837 and use a half of Terrorbit as Thalferrorbit, which
is the threshold for distinguishing the incidentally attacked watermarked images from
authenticated watermarked images.
The threshold for Tmalicious is derived as follows. The probability for a pixel to be
detected as tampered error pixels is ½[1−(½)8]=255/512=0.4980. The probability for a
pixel to be detected as strongly tampered error pixel is
(C84  C85  C86  C87  C88 )  0.59  163 / 512  0.3184 . Then, the expected value (i.e.,

E(strongtampix)) and the variance of strongly tampered error pixels (i.e.,
Var(strongtampix)) are 163/512×numel and 163/512×(1-163/512)×numel =
0.3184×0.6816×numel = 0.2170×numel, respectively. The expected value of tampered
error pixels (i.e., E(tampix)) is 0.4980×numel. Therefore, we deduce the threshold for
detecting malicious attacks by:
  E ( strongtampix ) 
6
P(Tmalicious   2 )  1  P(Tmalicious   2 )  1   
  1  10
 Var ( strongtampix ) 
4964.9
  2  4964.9  Tmalicious 
 0.6085
E (tampix )

That is, we consider the attack on the watermarked image is malicious if M2 ≥
Tmalicious = 0.6085.

(14)
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Validation of Defined Error Pixels and
Authentication Measures
The definitions of the three categories of error pixels and the two authentication
measures are guided by the following observations. 1) Most error pixels would spread
across the error map if incidental attacks were made on the watermarked image. 2) Most
error pixels would cluster in distorted regions if malicious attacks were made on the
watermarked image. Figure 8 demonstrates these two observations by showing the error
pixel distribution after performing no attack and performing three attacks (i.e., obvious
malicious attack by adding a black square, JPEG compression attack with the 80%
quality factor, and obvious malicious attack by adding a black square followed by JPEG
compression of an 80% quality factor) on the standard watermarked “Lena” image,
respectively. For the error pixel distribution under each attack, we sequentially display
the distribution of all error pixels (i.e., ErrorMap), tampered error pixels, and strongly
tampered error pixels. We clearly observe the following. 1) Figure 8(a) shows that
ErrorMap contains all 0’s when no attack occurs to the watermarked image. In other
words, all the watermark bits are successfully extracted, and the probe image is authentic.
2) Figure 8(b) shows that ErrorMap contains exclusively clustered tampered error pixels
when the malicious attack is applied to the watermarked image. The strongly tampered
error pixels are also clustered within the tampered areas under this malicious attack
without any JPEG compression. 3) Figure 8(c) shows that ErrorMap contains a majority
of randomly spread tampered error pixels when the incidental attack is applied to the
watermarked image. The strongly tampered error pixels tend to be isolated under the
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Figure 8. Illustration of the error pixel distribution.
incidental attack. 4) Figure 8(d) shows that ErrorMap contains a majority of clustered
tampered error pixels resulting from the malicious attack, and a few randomly spread
tampered error pixels resulting from the JPEG compression attack, when the combined
malicious and JPEG attack is applied to the watermarked image. The strongly tampered
error pixels are also clustered within the tampered areas under this combined attack.
Based on the predefined thresholds, the system successfully detects each watermarked
image shown in Figure 8(a), Figure 8(b), Figure 8(c), and Figure 8(d) as authenticated,
maliciously attacked, incidentally attacked, and maliciously attacked, respectively.
Figure 8 illustrates the error pixel distribution: (a) the watermarked image; (b) the
maliciously attacked watermarked image without any JPEG compression; (c) the 80%
JPEG compressed watermarked image; (d) The maliciously attacked watermarked image
followed by 80% JPEG compression, along with their corresponding ErrorMap’s in
terms of all error pixels, tampered error pixels, and strongly tampered error pixels. The
size of the error map is enlarged for easy reading of error pixels.
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CHAPTER III
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In the following, we quantitatively evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme
in terms of the quality of the watermarked image, the robustness of the secured
watermark, the tampering detection sensitivity, and the localization capability.
Quality of the Watermarked Image
In the proposed scheme, image distortion is caused by modifications of the wavelet
coefficients in the embedding process. Both the quantizer q and the watermark payload p
(i.e., the number of watermark bits embedded in the host image) affect the quality of the
watermarked image. A larger quantizer incurs more modification to the wavelet
coefficients and consequently results in more degradation of the watermarked image.
Similarly, a larger payload leads to more degradation of the watermarked image. In the
following, we derive the mean squared error (MSE) incurred in the embedding process,
using the assumption that the original wavelet coefficients are uniformly distributed over
the range of [kq, (k+1)q] for k  Z . When the parity of the quantization result of the
original wavelet coefficient LLi(1, 1) matches the embedded watermark bit Wi, LLi(1,1) is
modified to the lower-bound kq, and the MSE caused by this quantization is:
MSE1 

1 q 2
q2

d


q 0
3

(15)

Otherwise, LLi (1, 1) is modified to the upper-bound (k+1)q and the MSE caused by
this quantization is:

26
MSE2 

1 q
q2
(  q) 2 d 

q 0
3

(16)

As a result, the average distortion caused by embedding one watermark bit is q2/3,
and the MSE of embedding p watermark bits in the block-based wavelet domain is:
MSE 

p  q2
3 W  H

(17)

where W and H are the width and the height of the host image, respectively. According
to Parseval’s theorem, the MSE of the entire image equals its counterpart in the wavelet
domain [20]. Therefore, the PSNR value of the watermarked image is:
 255 3  W  H
PSNR  20 log 10 
p
 q




255 3  W  H
  20 log 10 

W H

q


bs  bs




  20 log 10  255  bs 3 



q





(18)

where bs denotes the size of each embedding square block. The above clearly reveals
that the quality of the watermarked image is determined by both p and q. Smaller p’s and
q’s lead to larger PSNR values. In the proposed system, p equals to W×H/16. Based on
formula (14), if a fixed quantizer is used for the quantization of watermark embedding
process, the expected PSNR values are 44.12, 42.66, 41.42, and 40.33 for quantizers of
11, 13, 15, and 17, respectively.
The experimental results on 30 standard 8-bit grayscale images show that by using
the proposed scheme with the adaptive quantizer, the average PSNR value of their
watermarked images is 41.39. This average is consistent with the computed expected
values and is higher than the empirical value (i.e., 35.00 db) for the image without
perceivable degradation [21].
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Robustness of the Secured Watermark
Since we use the same strategy to generate the secured watermark in both the
watermark embedding process and watermark authentication process, the robustness of
the secured watermark is important to the proposed scheme. In other words, ideally, the
regenerated secured watermark at the extraction side is supposed to be the same as the
secured watermark generated in the embedding process. To analyze the robustness of the
secured watermark, we next clarify three aspects of the analysis process, which aspects
are also the main steps of generating the secured watermark.
Using a specific non-overlapping 4×4 block Blk as an example, we start the
explanation with the quantization of non-overlapping 8×8 blocks, using the quantization
matrix used in JPEG compression. By applying this step, modification within the range
of [-coef’s/2, coef’s/2] can be preserved. That is, when modifications have been applied
to block Blk, the secured watermark bit can still be regenerated if the modification on a
particular value of a block falls within the range of [-coef’s/2, coef’s/2], where coef’s is
the quantization value at the same position of the quantization matrix (shown in Figure
4). From Figure 4, we can tell that coefficients of different locations in block Blk have a
different robustness since their corresponding quantization values differ at different
locations.
Secondly, we calculate the SV’s of subblock1, subblock2, and subblock3 of block Blk.
Because we generate bits B1, B2, and B3 using the relationships among the SV’s and the
relationships are more stable than the SV’s themselves, it is reasonable to assume that the
regenerated watermark bit will be the same as the corresponding watermark bit in the
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embedding process. In other words, B1, B2, and B3, which encode the relationships
between each pair of the SV’s of the quantized horizontal, vertical, and diagonal
subbands, will not be changed even when the values of SV’s can be changed because of
modifications of block Blk.
Thirdly, we generate the watermark bit by using formula (5) to complement any
possible changes in the three relationships encoded in B1, B2, and B3. In other words, this
step is to increase the possibility that the regenerated watermark bit is the same as the
watermark bit generated in the embedding process, even when B1, B2, or B3 (i.e., either of
the three relationships) is different from the ones generated in the embedding process.
For example, changes in S1i (1, 1) may lead to the changes in any of two relationships,
i.e., B1 and B3. If both relationships are changed, our watermark generation process
ensures that the regenerated watermark bit sequence is the same as the watermark bit
sequence generated in the embedding process. Even when either of the relationships is
changed, the regenerated watermark bit sequence may still stay the same if B2 is changed.
As a result, our proposed content-based watermark generation scheme is robust when
incidental attacks are applied to the watermarked image. Our extensive experimental
results also confirm this.
Here, we use one detailed example to illustrate the robustness of the secured
watermark.
Figure 9(a) shows generating the content-based watermark bit of a 4×4 block in the
embedding process. The block is from the example host image “Lena” whose size is
512×512, and the coefficients of the block are the intersection of row 1 to 4 and column 9
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to 12 of “Lena.” So, the upper left 16 coefficients of quantization matrix Q are used in
the modification process in Figure 9(a). Figure 9(b) shows regeneration of the contentbased watermark bit of the block at the same position after applying JPEG compression
on the host image. Here, we choose a compression ratio as 75, which is the default
compression ratio of jpeg compression in Matlab. From Figure 9, we can see that even
though the block has been changed after JPEG compression, the content-based watermark
bit “Bit’” regenerated in the authentication process is the same as the watermark bit “Bit”
generated in the embedding process.
Tampering Detection Sensitivity
The tampering detection sensitivity of the proposed scheme is determined by the
quantizer. The error map captures the changes in the quantization results and makes the
tampering detectable for k  Z in the following two cases:
1. The wavelet coefficient LLi’(1,1) of the watermarked image is 2kq, and the
manipulation causes a shift of LLi’(1,1) in the range of [(0.5+2k)q, (1.5+2k)q).
2. The wavelet coefficient LLi’(1,1) of the watermarked image is 2kq+q, and the
manipulation causes a shift of LLi’(1,1) in the range of [(1.5+2k)q, (2.5+2k)q).
That is, the scheme is capable of detecting all the changes satisfying the above two
conditions. Small changes of a half of the quantizer q or other changes falling in the
range of [(-0.5+2k)q, (0.5+2k)q] in the distorted area do not modify the parity of the
quantized approximation value. As a result, the scheme is robust to moderate image
content preserving attacks that do not dramatically change the pixel intensity.
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Figure 9. Example of the robustness of the secured watermark. (a) Generate the
content watermark bit of the 4×4 block in embedding process.
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Figure 9 cont. Example of the robustness of the secured watermark.
(b) Generate the content watermark bit of the 4×4 block in authentication process.
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However, some pixels in the tampered area may be missed when the changes in the
wavelet domain do not satisfy the above two conditions. To address this shortcoming,
the authentication process utilizes the distribution of the detected error pixels to evaluate
the authenticity of the probe image. Specifically, the observations shown in Figure 8 are
incorporated to compensate for the possible misclassification in ErrorMap. Furthermore,
q is adaptive in the proposed scheme. That is, q’s vary for different non-overlapping
blocks in the proposed scheme. Such variation reduces even further the possibility of
misclassifying, given that the range of [(-0.5+2k)q, (0.5+2k)q] where the
misclassification will happen is inconsistent across the whole image.
Generally, tampering detection sensitivity can still be adjusted by choosing different
window sizes and thresholds. If the threshold is preset, the larger the window size, the
lower the sensitivity. Based on the application requirements, the proposed scheme can
identify various tampered areas and detect bigger alterations, while still bypassing
smaller alterations using a predetermined window size.
Localization Capability
In the proposed scheme, image content is monitored by the embedded and extracted
watermark. Specifically, changing a value in the upper-left 2×2 corner of each 4×4 block
may result in a mismatch in ErrorMap. To compensate for the misclassification, we
employ a window size of 3×3 to categorize each non-isolated error pixel as either
strongly tampered or mildly tampered, as defined in the Watermark Authentication
section of Chapter II. Localization capability refers to the capability to find the smallest
tampered area (also termed the detection unit) in a probe image. Here, we start the
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analysis with any possibly smallest 3×3 block in ErrorMap, wherein all nine pixels in the
block are error pixels and all the pixels outside of the block are non-error pixels (shown
in Figure 10(a.1)). Based on the definition of three kinds of error pixels (illustrated in
Figure 7), we know that the five error pixels marked by solid red circles are strongly
tampered error pixels and all nine error pixels in the 3×3 block are tampered error pixels.
Therefore, M2 = 5/9 = 0.5556, which is less than the threshold of Tmalicious (i.e., 0.6085),
and we conclude that the 3×3 block is not a maliciously tampered area. However, the
values of M2 are 0.625 and 0.714 when the error pixel distributions follow the sample
patterns shown in Figure 10(a.2) and Figure 10(a.3), respectively. That is, the proposed
scheme can achieve a 12×12 detection unit when the error pixels follow the sample
distributions shown in Figure 10(a.2) and Figure 10(a.3).
Next, we consider any 3×4 or 4×3 block containing 12 error pixels (shown in Figure
10(b.1)) in ErrorMap. All the remaining pixels in ErrorMap are non-error pixels. To
simplify the discussion, we only consider a block of 3×4 since the authentication results
for a block of 4×3 can be similarly derived. Based on the definition of three kinds of
error pixels, we know that the eight error pixels marked by solid red circles are strongly
tampered error pixels and all the 12 error pixels are tampered error pixels. Therefore, M2
= 8/12 = 0.6667, which is larger than the threshold of Tmalicious (i.e., 0.6085), and we
conclude that the 3×4 block is a maliciously tampered area. That is, the scheme can
successfully achieve a 12×16 or 16×12 detection unit using the proposed authentication
measures. It can also correctly identify smaller malicious attacks within the detection
unit of 12×16 (i.e., the tampered areas resulting from these malicious attacks are irregular
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and nonblock-based), which follow the sample error pixel distributions as shown in
Figure 10(b.2) through Figure 10(b.6), since their values of M2’s are all larger than the
threshold of 0.6085.
Table 2 summarizes error pixel distributions in a 3×3 block as shown inFigure 10(a),
and Table 3 summarizes error pixel distributions in a 3×4 block as shown in Figure 10(b).

Figure 10. Illustration of different error pixels distributions in 3×3 and 3×4 blocks.
Table 2 Error Pixel Distributions (a).
figure
a.1
a.2
a.3

number of cases
1
4
2

error pixels
9
8
7

strongly tampered pixels
5
5
5

M2 value
0.56
0.625
0.714

Table 3 Error Pixel Distributions (b).
figure
b.1
b.2
b.3
b.4
b.5
b.6

number of cases
1
4
8
4
2
4

error pixels
12
11
11
10
10
9

strongly tampered pixels
8
8
7
8
7
7

M2 value
0.67
0.73
0.64
0.8
0.7
0.78
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CHAPTER IV
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
To evaluate the performance of the proposed semi-fragile watermarking scheme, we
first compared the quality of the watermarked images of the proposed scheme and four
peer schemes, namely, Maeno et al.’s scheme using the random bias [6], Yang and Sun’s
scheme [15], Che et al.’s scheme [16], and Cruz et al.’s scheme [17], using five
representative 8-bit 512×512 grayscale images. We then conducted extensive
experiments on 30 standard 8-bit grayscale images by comparing the proposed system
with these four peer systems. Different kinds of attempted manipulations were simulated.
These simulated manipulations include the following: ten levels of image blurring, ten
levels of Gaussian low-pass filtering, ten levels of median filtering, five levels of salt and
pepper noise addition, ten levels of JPEG lossy compression, ten levels of JPEG2000
lossy compression, adding an irregular shape of three kinds of gray-level intensities (i.e.,
black, gray, and white) without compression, and using Photoshop software to paste,
delete, and modify an object.
To ensure a fair comparison, we carefully studied the authentication process of each
scheme to find its equivalent measure(s) to those used in the proposed scheme. We found
that all four peer schemes used a measure similar to the M1’s of the proposed scheme in
their authentication process. Yang’s scheme also used another measure similar to the
M2’s of the proposed scheme. In addition, Yang’s scheme explicitly summarized the
thresholds for detecting a probe image as authentic, incidentally distorted, or maliciously
distorted. The other three schemes did not explicitly mention the thresholds for their
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decision making. However, we could roughly infer their thresholds from their
discussions. These thresholds are around 0.3 and are a little bit higher than Thalferrorbit
(i.e., 0.2418) for M1’s in the proposed scheme. All four peer schemes visually showed
the error maps or the localization results without listing the values of their authentication
measures. That is, they all replied on the visual inspection to show the effectiveness of
their localization results. In the experiments on various malicious attacks, we showed
both the values of the authentication measures and the localization results to validate the
effectiveness of the proposed scheme.
Watermark Invisibility
Figure 11 summarizes the PSNR values after embedding watermarks in five
representative images using the proposed scheme and four peer schemes, respectively.
This figure clearly shows that all of the PSNR values are larger than 40.00 db and are
comparable with the expected PSNR value computed in The Quality of the Watermarked
Image section of Chapter III. With the exception of Cruz’s scheme [17], the PSNR
values of the proposed scheme are also higher than or comparable to the PSNR values of
the four peer schemes that embeds watermark bits in larger blocks of 16×16.
Robustness to Common Image Processing Attacks
We performed four kinds of representative image processing attacks on 30
watermarked images. These attacks were ten levels of image blurring attacks using
circular averaging filters of radii of 1.1 to 2 with an increasing step size of 0.1, ten levels
of Gaussian low-pass filtering attacks using rotationally symmetric Gaussian low-pass
filters of size 3×3 and standard deviation ranging from 0.1 to 1 with an increasing step
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Figure 11. Comparison of PSNR values.
size of 0.1, ten levels of median filtering attacks using filters of radii of 3 to 12 with an
increasing step size of 1, and five levels of salt and peppers noise attacks using noise
density ranging from 0.01 to 0.05 with an increasing step size of 0.01. Since all four peer
schemes used a measure similar to the M1’s of the proposed scheme in the authentication
process, we plotted the average M1 values of 30 watermarked images under each image
processing attack for all five schemes on the left side of Figure 12. Yang’s scheme also
used another measure similar to the M2’s of the proposed scheme in the authentication
process. As a result, we plotted the average M2 values of 30 watermarked images under
each image processing attack for these two schemes on the right side of Figure 12.
The left column in Figure 12 shows the comparison of various common image
processing attacks on M1’s of the proposed scheme and four peer schemes, while the right
column shows the M2’s of the proposed scheme and Yang’s scheme: (a) image blurring
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(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Figure 12. Comparison of various common image processing attacks.
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attacks; (b) Gaussian low-pass filtering attacks; (c) median filtering attacks; (d) salt and
pepper noise attacks.
Figure 12 clearly shows that all the average values of the values of M2’s of the
proposed scheme are below the threshold line of 0.6085 for all image processing attacks.
Specifically, the watermarked image under blurring, Gaussian low-pass filtering, or salt
and pepper noise attacks were detected as authenticated if their M1 values were smaller
than Thalferrorbit (0.2418) and as incidentally distorted if their M1 values were between
Thalferrorbit (0.2418) and Terrorbit (0.4837). The watermarked image under median filtering
attacks with a filter size ranging from 3 to 7 was detected as incidentally distorted since
its M1 value is between Thalferrorbit and Terrorbit. However, the scheme detected the
watermarked image under median filtering attacks with a larger filter size as a noncopyrighted image since its M1 value is larger than 0.4837. This is reasonable due to
significant changes on the watermarked image. In addition, as shown in Figure 12, all
average values of M1’s of the proposed scheme under all image processing attacks except
the “salt and pepper” attack are the smallest among all four schemes, and all average
values of M2’s of the proposed scheme are smaller than the corresponding values of
Yang’s method. As a matter of fact, M1’s of the proposed scheme under the salt and
pepper attack are still comparable with those of Yang’s scheme as shown in Figure 12(d).
This indicates that under any of these image processing attacks, the proposed scheme is
more robust in classifying a watermarked image as authentic or incidentally distorted.
Specifically, the proposed scheme successfully detected all 30 watermarked images under
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Gaussian low-pass filtering, salt and pepper noise addition, or image blurring attacks with
circular averaging filters of radii smaller than or equal to 1.4 as authentic.
Robustness to JPEG Lossy Compression and
JPEG2000 Lossy Compression Attacks
We performed two kinds of compressions, namely, conventional JPEG lossy
compression and JPEG2000 lossy compression, on 30 watermarked images. The left plot
of Figure 13 compares the average values of M1’s of 30 watermarked images under no
attack and various JPEG compression attacks using quality factors of 100% down to 10%
with a decreasing step size of 10% of all five schemes. The right plot of Figure 13
compares the average values of M2’s of 30 watermarked images under no attack and the
same ten levels of JPEG compression attacks of the proposed scheme and Yang’s
scheme. Figure 13 clearly shows that all the average values of M2’s of the proposed
scheme are much smaller than the corresponding average values of Yang’s scheme, and
they are below the threshold line of 0.6085 for JPEG compressions of a quality factor
down to 10%. That is, the watermarked image under JPEG compressions of a quality
factor down to 20% is detected as authentic if its M1 value is smaller than 0.2418 and as
incidentally distorted if its M1 value is between 0.2418 and 0.4837. In addition, the
average M1 values of the proposed scheme generally are much smaller than the
corresponding average values of four peer schemes for JPEG quality factors down to
30%. The proposed scheme is also the only one that increases steadily even when the
quality factor is down to lower than 50%, while the others increase sharply.
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Figure 13. Comparison of various JEPG compression attacks.
All these data indicate that the proposed scheme is more robust in classifying a
watermarked image under JPEG compressions of at least a 50% quality factor as
authentic and classifying a watermarked image under JPEG compressions of a quality
factor ranging from 10% to 50% as incidentally distorted. The experimental results on 30
watermarked images also confirm this. None of the four peer schemes achieves the
comparable performance as the proposed scheme. Specifically, they detect the
watermarked images under JPEG compressions of at least a 60% quality factor as
incidentally distorted or authentic and detect the watermarked images under JPEG
compressions of 10% to 50% quality factors as maliciously distorted.
Figure 13 also shows a comparison of various JEPG compression attacks on M1’s
(left) of the proposed scheme and four peer schemes and M2’s (right) of the proposed
scheme and Yang’s scheme.
To evaluate the robustness of the proposed scheme to JPEG2000 lossy compression
attacks, we further compare the average values of M1’s and M2’s of 30 watermarked
images under various JPEG2000 compression attacks using quality factors of 1000%
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down to 100% with a decreasing step size of 100%, and their equivalent JPEG
compression attacks using quality factors of 100% down to 10% with a decreasing step
size of 10%, as shown in Figure 14. We also plot the values of M1’s and M2’s under each
attack after adding or subtracting the STDV (standard deviation values) from their
average values. As clearly shown in Figure 14, all the average values of M1’s and M2’s
for JPEG2000 compression attacks are much smaller than the ones for JPEG compression
attacks. The relationship holds true for the average values of M1’s and M2’s adding or
subtracting their corresponding STDV’s. In addition, the values of M2’s are below the
threshold line of 0.6085 for all JPEG2000 compressions, and the values of M1’s are
below the threshold line of 0.2418 for all JPEG2000 compressions, except the one with
the quality factor of 100%. That is, the watermarked image under JPEG2000
compressions of a quality factor down to 200% is detected as authentic. The
experimental results also clearly demonstrate that the proposed scheme is more robust
against JPEG2000 compression attacks than JPEG compression attacks since it works in
the wavelet domain, which is the same domain that JPEG2000 compression works in.

Figure 14. Comparison of JEPG2000 compression and JPEG compression attacks.
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Finally, Figure 14 shows the comparison of various JEPG2000 compression attacks
and their corresponding JPEG compression attacks on M1’s (left) and M2’s (right) of the
proposed scheme.
Fragility to Various Malicious Attacks
We performed various malicious attacks on 30 watermarked images to demonstrate
the effectiveness of the proposed scheme in localizing the maliciously tampered regions.
The yellow sections in Figure 15 show the tampering localization results of five
schemes after adding an irregular shape of three kinds of gray-level intensities (i.e.,
black, gray, and white) to the watermarked “Lena” image, wherein black is the most
dissimilar to the background intensity and gray is the most similar to the background
intensity. We deliberately did not apply compression attacks to ensure that we could
separate out the effect of JPEG compressions. Figure 15 clearly shows that the proposed
scheme achieves similar localization results to Che’s scheme and outperforms the other
three schemes by correctly localizing the tampered regions regardless of the gray-level
intensity of the added irregular shape. In Figure 15, whenever applicable, we also list M1
and M2 values in a pair for each scheme to facilitate comparison. Based on the
authentication algorithm, we conclude that the proposed scheme detects these three
maliciously attacked watermarked “Lena” images as maliciously tampered and correctly
localizes their tampered regions. Yang’s scheme is able to detect the watermarked image
adding a gray or white irregular shape as maliciously attacked. However, it detects the
watermarked image adding a black irregular shape as incidentally distorted. It also does
not produce a decent localization result under any of the three malicious attacks. The
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Figure 15. Comparison of malicious attacks (irregular shape).
other three peer schemes obtain small values for M1’s, which are similar to the values
obtained under image processing and JPEG compression attacks. As a result, they detect
these maliciously attacked watermarked “Lena” images as incidentally distorted based on
the equivalent predefined thresholds.
Figure 15 also shows a comparison of the localization results after adding an irregular
shape of different intensities (black, gray, and white) without JPEG compression among
the following (from left to right): the proposed scheme, Yang, Che, Maeno, and Cruz.
Figure 16 demonstrates the tampering localization results on four additional
representative watermarked images, which were maliciously attacked by adding the same
irregular shape of three kinds of gray-level intensities (i.e., black, gray, and white) to the
watermarked images. We also list the M1 and M2 values in a pair below each localization
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Figure 16. Illustration of the results of malicious attacks (irregular shape) of the
proposed scheme.
result. This figure clearly shows that the proposed scheme successfully localizes the
tampered regions. Based on the predefined thresholds, we conclude that the proposed
scheme detects all these maliciously attacked watermarked images as maliciously
tampered.
Figure 16 also illustrates the results of malicious attacks (irregular shape) of the
proposed scheme: attacked images by adding black irregular shape (1st column), the
corresponding detected distortion regions (2nd column), attacked images by adding gray
irregular shape (3rd column), the corresponding detected distortion regions (4th column),

46
attacked images by adding white irregular shape (5th column), and the corresponding
detected distortion regions (6th column).
We further applied three kinds of more realistic modifications on the watermarked
“Lena” image by using Photoshop to insert an external object (decoration on hat), modify
the right eye, and remove the object (white and gray wavy decoration) on the lower right,
respectively. The maliciously attacked “Lena” image was then saved as a JPG image
using the default compression setting. Figure 17 demonstrates the localization results,
shown in yellow, of five schemes and lists the M1 and M2 values, whenever applicable, in
a pair for each scheme. The figure clearly shows that the proposed scheme achieves the
best and the cleanest localization results and that Maeno’s scheme achieves the second
best localization results with a few additional small isolated distorted regions resulting
from the JPEG compression. Che’s scheme achieves localization results comparable to
Maeno’s scheme except that it detects more distorted regions resulting from the JPEG
compression due to less robustness to JPEG compression. Based on the thresholds for
the two authentication measures, we conclude that the proposed scheme detects all three
maliciously attacked watermarked “Lena” image as maliciously tampered and correctly
localizes their tampered regions. Yang’s scheme detects these maliciously attacked
watermarked images as maliciously distorted. However, it does not produce a definite
localization result under any of the three malicious attacks due to less robustness to JPEG
compressions. The other three schemes obtain small values for M1’s, which are similar to
the values obtained under image processing and JPEG compression attacks. As a result,
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Figure 17. Comparison of malicious attacks (modified Lena by Photoshop).
they detect these maliciously attacked images as incidentally distorted based on the
equivalent predefined thresholds.
Figure 17 shows the comparison of the localization results after realistic malicious
attacks of the proposed scheme, Yang, Che, Maeno, and Cruz (from left to right).
Figure 18 demonstrates the tampering localization results on four additional
representative watermarked images, which were maliciously attacked by inserting an
external object or removing (modifying) an object using Photoshop. These maliciously
attacked images were then saved as JPG images using the default compression setting.
We also list the M1 and M2 values in a pair below each localization result. This figure
clearly shows that the proposed scheme successfully localizes the tampered regions.
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Figure 18. Illustration of the results of malicious attacks (modified by Photoshop) of
the proposed scheme.

Based on the predefined thresholds, we conclude that the proposed scheme detects all
these maliciously attacked watermarked images as maliciously tampered.
Figure 18 also illustrates the results of malicious attacks (modified by Photoshop) of
the proposed scheme: watermarked images (1st column), maliciously attacked images by
inserting an external object (2nd column), the corresponding detected distortion regions
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(3rd column), maliciously attacked images by modifying or removing an object (4th
column), and the corresponding detected distortion regions (5th column).
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this thesis, we present a novel semi-fragile watermarking scheme for image content
authentication with tampering localization. The contributions of the proposed scheme
are:


Utilizing the three relationships of SV’s of the horizontal, vertical, and diagonal
subbands of each 4×4 block to extract content-based watermark in both
watermark embedding and extraction processes.



Utilizing the summation of the three relationships of SV’s of the horizontal,
vertical, and diagonal subbands of each 4×4 block to choose its adaptive quantizer
q for both watermark embedding and extraction processes.



Applying the quantization method to embed the secured watermark, which is
obtained by applying the “xor” operation on content-based watermark and the
private-key-based content-independent watermark, in the wavelet domain so that
a majority of image distortions, which cause the intensity shift by a value larger
than a half of the quantizer q, can be detected in the authentication process.



Defining two authentication measures to quantitatively detect the authenticity of
the probe image and prove tampering, with M1 measuring the overall similarity
between extracted and embedded watermarks and M2 measuring the overall
clustering level of the tampered error pixels.
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Using a binary error map together with the two authentication measures in the
authentication process to compensate for possible misclassification in the error
map, capture all possible distortions, and localize all possible tampered areas.

My extensive experimental results show that the proposed scheme successfully
distinguishes malicious attacks from nonmalicious tampering of image content. It also
accurately localizes maliciously tampered regions. My scheme is more robust to
acceptable content-preserving operations and more fragile to malicious distortions than
four semi-fragile watermarking schemes.
My future work includes studying the tampering detection sensibility of the proposed
method when an image size changes, addressing geometric attack issues, and testing
more images of various types.
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